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Abstract
Election control considers the problem of an adversary who attempts to tamper with a voting process, in order to
either ensure that their favored candidate wins (constructive control) or another candidate loses (destructive control).
As online social networks have become significant sources of information for potential voters, a new tool in an
attacker’s arsenal is to effect control by harnessing social influence, for example, by spreading fake news and other
forms of misinformation through online social media.
We consider the computational problem of election control via social influence, studying the conditions under
which finding good adversarial strategies is computationally feasible. We consider two objectives for the adversary
in both the constructive and destructive control settings: probability and margin of victory (POV and MOV, respec-
tively). We present several strong negative results, showing, for example, that the problem of maximizing POV is
inapproximable for any constant factor. On the other hand, we present approximation algorithms which provide
somewhat weaker approximation guarantees, such as bicriteria approximations for the POV objective and constant-
factor approximations for MOV. Finally, we present mixed integer programming formulations for these problems.
Experimental results show that our approximation algorithms often find near-optimal control strategies, indicating
that election control through social influence is a salient threat to election integrity.
1 Introduction
The integrity of elections is crucial to the functioning of democratic institutions. As a result, a large body of work
has focused on the robustness of elections to various forms of control, where a malicious party attempts to manipulate
election results, for example, by bribing voters and adding or removing votes. While it is important to understand the
vulnerability of elections to such control, there are many countries where blatant tampering is (fortunately) uncommon.
For instance, outright voter fraud is very rare in the United States federal and state elections [1, 12].
However, more subtle forms of election control may attempt to subvert legitimate information channels towards
malicious means. For example, political advertising and news (in the editorial form) are common legitimate means
for convincing prospective voters. Such communication, when sufficiently transparent, is often critical to the effective
functioning of democracy, and can exert considerable influence on voting behavior [23, 15, 5]. Malicious control over
information promulgated through these channels can thus have considerable impact, but is also difficult to achieve due
to the relative transparency of traditional media sources.
The increasing importance of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, for propagating information, including
about political issues [11, 42, 27], is a game changer. Both the decentralized nature of information sources on social
media, and their associated lack of transparency, present malicious parties with an unprecedented opportunity to
influence a democratic political process. Recent evidence of deliberate election tampering in the 2016 US presidential
election through fake news—deliberately falsified news content—suggests that this issue is a major concern for election
integerity for years to come [2]. For example, it is estimated that the typical American adult saw at least one fake news
story during the election cycle [2], and such stories have been shown to impact voters’ judgment [39].
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Motivated by these concerns, we initiate the first algorithmic study of the problem of election control through
social influence. In our setting, there is a social network of voters who elect a single winner by plurality vote. An
outside party may select a subset of nodes as seed nodes for a news story or advertisement. Each of these seed nodes
shares the story with their friends. Each friend has some probability of being influenced in their voting preferences,
as well as sharing the story further. The question is whether, given a limited budget, the attacker can influence enough
voters to ensure that a target candidate wins or loses the election.
This problem is closely related to influence maximization, which has been studied primarily in the context of viral
advertising. There, the objective is simply to maximize the expected number of people who receive a message. While
influence maximization admits a simple (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm, election control through social influence
presents a number of new algorithmic challenges. We study both constructive and destructive control for two different
objectives: 1) maximizing the expected margin by which a target candidate wins (loses) the election (margin of victory,
or MOV), and 2) maximizing the probability that a target candidate wins (loses) election (probability of victory, or
POV).
Summary of main results: We provide a mix of negative (hardness and inapproximability) and positive (algorithmic)
results for the problem of election control through social influence. Our main contributions are the following:
• We show that the MOV objective in the two candidate case is monotone submodular and hence admits a (1−1/e)
greedy approximation algorithm.
• We prove that the POV objective is hard to approximate to within any multiplicative factor for both constructive
and destructive control, even in elections with only two candidates.
• We provide a bicriteria approximation algorithm for the POV objective in the two-candidate case. In fact, our
algorithm applies to the more general problem of maximizing the probability that a submodular function exceeds
a given threshold value and may be of general interest.
• In the multicandidate case, we provide algorithms which achieve similar guarantees as the two-candidate case
up to the loss of a constant factor (independent of the number of candidates). Such guarantees hold for both
constructive and destructive control, for both the MOV and POV objectives.
• We give mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulations for all of the above settings which can be used
to find optimal solutions.
• We experimentally compare our approximation algorithms to the optimal strategies produced by the MILP.
Despite formal hardness results, our approximation algorithms often find near-optimal solutions, particularly
for the MOV objective. This suggests that computational hardness may not always be a practical barrier to
controlling elections via social influence.
2 Related work
Our work is closely related to two research areas: election control and influence maximization. These bodies of work
are separate: to our knowledge there is no previous work which considers election control using social influence. The
computational study of election control was started by Bartholdi et al. [3], who considered constructive control. The
destructive control setting was introduced by Hemaspaandra et al. [26]. A large body of work has studied election
control under different settings and voting rules [14, 18] including bribing voters [20, 22, 4, 19, 44], adding or deleting
voters [17, 32, 21, 31], and adding or deleting candidates [7, 21, 31]. Another topic is strategic behavior on the part
of the voters themselves [34, 37, 38]. The main difference between our work and previous work on election control is
that we introduce and analyze social influence as a novel mechanism for both constructive and destructive control.
There is a large, parallel literature devoted to influence maximization in social networks. This line of work was in-
troduced by Kempe et al. [28] who introduced influence maximization in the independent cascade model and proposed
a greedy algorithm based on submodularity. Since then, a number of newer algorithms have been proposed, mostly
attempting to scale up the greedy algorithm to very large graphs [9, 13, 41, 24]. Subsequent work has also introduced
several related settings, e.g., continuous time dynamics [40, 16], bandit settings where dynamics are learned over time
[10, 30, 6], or robust problems where influence probabilities are uncertain [25, 8, 33, 43]. None of this work considers
using social influence to control an election, and our setting brings a range of new technical challenges. Almost all
2
work on influence maximization is founded on submodularity of the objective function. However, even though we use
the same model of influence spread, objectives related to election control often violate submodularity, and we need to
develop new algorithmic techniques. We mention here work by Krause et al. [29] on robust submodular optimization.
For optimizing the POV objective, we use a similar form of surrogate objective. However, our objective is to maximize
the probability of a desired outcome, not the worst-case value, so both our final algorithm and analysis are novel.
3 Problem formulation
We consider an election with candidates C = {c∗, c1, c2, ...c`}. c∗ is a special target candidate, and the objective of
the election control problem is to make c∗ either win the election (constructive control) or lose (destructive control).
The voters are the nodes of a graph G = (V,E). Each voter v has an ordering piv over the candidates and casts a vote
for piv(1), i.e., their first ranked candidate. We assume that voters do not behave strategically. The winner is decided
via the plurality rule (the candidate with the most votes wins the election). If there is a tie, we say that the attacker
fails. This tie-breaking does not impact any of our results. Let V jci = {v ∈ V : piv(j) = ci} be the set of voters who
rank candidate ci in place j. Initially, ci has |V 1ci | votes.
Social influence: There is an attacker who wishes to change the results of the election by spreading messages
which cause voters to change their ordering over candidates. In constructive control, the attacker can spread a message
which causes any voter v who becomes influenced to promote c∗ by one place in piv (exchanging c∗ with the candidate
previously ranked above them). If piv(c∗) = 1, the message has no effect on v, but v may still decide to share
the message with their neighbors. In destructive control, a voter who is influenced demotes c∗ by one place in piv .
Influence spreads via the independent cascade model (ICM), the most common model in the influence maximization
literature. Each edge (u, v) ∈ E has a propagation probability pu,v . If u is influenced, it makes one attempt to
influence each neighbor v. Each attempt succeeds independently with probability pu,v . The attacker may select a set
of k seed nodes who are influenced at the start of the process. The diffusion then proceeds in discrete time steps until
no new activations are made.
We also introduce a useful alternate view of the ICM, the live-graph model. We can equivalently see the ICM as
removing each edge (u, v) from the graph with probability 1 − pu,v . A node is influenced if it is reachable from any
seed node via the edges that remain. Call any specific setting of present/absent edges a scenario y, with induced graph
Gy . Let m = 2|E| be the total number of scenarios. Let f(S, y) denote the number of nodes which are reachable from
any seed node in S on graphGy . The expected number of nodes influenced under the ICM is just f(S) = Ey [f(S, y)].
Similarly, the probability that the number of influenced nodes exceeds any threshold value ∆ is Pry [f(S, y) ≥ ∆]. At
times, we will want to specifically reason about the probability some subset of V is influenced. For any A ⊆ V , let
f(S, y,A) denote the number of nodes in A reachable from S in scenario y. Analogously, f(S,A) = Ey[f(S, y,A)].
We remark that such functions can be evaluated up to arbitrary precision by averaging over random samples for y. For
simplicity, we ignore such issues here since they are well understood [41, 9, 13].
Objectives: We now formally introduce our two objectives, starting with the simpler two-candidate case. In a
two-candidate election, constructive and destructive control are clearly equivalent since maximizing the probability
that c∗ loses is the same as maximizing the probability that the other candidate wins (and vice versa). Hence, we study
only constructive control without loss of generality.
In the margin of victory (MOV) objective, we want to maximize the expected number of votes by which c∗ wins
the election. We define our objective as the change in the expected margin:
MOV(S) = 2E
y
[
f(S, y, V 2c∗)
]
.
The factor 2 is present since reaching a voter in V 2c∗ both adds a vote for c∗ and removes a vote for the opponent.
We study the expected change in the margin (not the margin itself) so that approximation ratios are well defined even
when the margin is negative.
In the probability of victory (POV) objective, we want to maximize the probability that c∗ wins the election. Let
∆ = 12
(|V 1c1 |−|V 1c∗ |) + 1 be the number of voters that c∗ needs to reach in order to win the election. The POV
objective is
POV(S) = Pr
y
[
f(S, y, V 2c∗) ≥ ∆
]
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which is just the probability that at least ∆ of the voters who have c∗ in second place are reached.
In the multicandidate case, constructive and destructive control are no longer equivalent. Further, the impact of
messages is more complex than before. E.g., in constructive control not only does c∗ gain a vote, but another candidates
loses a vote; we need to keep track of the number of votes lost by each other candidate.
We start out by defining functions which give the change in the margin between c∗ and another candidate ci in a
given scenario y when seed set S is chosen. Let χ(v, S, y) be 1 if node v is reachable from seed set S in the graph Gy .
The change in margin (in constructive and destructive control, respectively) is given by
gC(S, y, ci) =
∑
v∈V 2c∗\V 1ci
χ(v, S, y) + 2
∑
v∈V 2c∗∩V 1ci
χ(v, S, y)
gD(S, y, ci) =
∑
v∈V 1c∗\V 2ci
χ(v, S, y) + 2
∑
v∈V 1c∗∩V 2ci
χ(v, S, y)
which gives value 2 for every node that is flipped from ci to c∗ (or vice versa) and hence count double towards
the margin, and 1 for other nodes. Based on this, we now give expressions for the change in margin given any fixed
scenario y and seed set S. We start with constructive control. Note that before any intervention, the margin is just
maxci |V 1ci |−|V 1c∗ |. Afterwards, the margin is maxcj |V 1cj |−gC(S, y, cj)− |V 1c∗ |. Hence, the change in margin is
mC(S, y) =
[
max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1c∗ |
]
−
[
max
cj
|V 1cj |−gC(S, y, cj)− |V 1c∗ |
]
= min
cj
(
gC(S, y, cj) + max
ci
|V 1ci |−
∣∣∣V 1cj ∣∣∣) .
That is, the change in margin is driven by candidate with largest starting vote (|V 1cj |) and smallest loss in vote
(gC(S, y, cj)). Now considering all scenarios y, the constructive control objectives are
MOVC(S) = E
y
[mC(S, y)] POVC(S) = Pr
y
[mC(S, y) ≥ ∆C ] .
where ∆C = maxci |V 1ci |−|V 1c∗ |+1 is the necessary change in margin for c∗ to win. For destructive control, we
can similarly write the change in margin and corresponding objectives as
mD(S, y) = max
ci
(
gD(S, y, ci) + |V 1ci |
)−max
cj
|V 1cj |
MOVD(S) = E
y
[mD(S, y)] POVD(S) = Pr
y
[mD(S, y) ≥ ∆D] .
where ∆D = |V 1c∗ |−maxci |V 1ci |+1.
4 Elections with two candidates
We start with elections with only two candidates. Recall that in this setting, constructive and destructive control are
equivalent, so our results are stated only for constructive control (trying to ensure c∗ wins the election). In order to state
our algorithmic results, we first introduce some background on submodular optimization and influence maximization.
A set function f : V → R is submodular if for allA ⊆ B ⊆ V and all x 6∈ B, f(A∪{x})−f(A) ≥ f(B∪{x})−f(B).
Intuitively, submodularity formalizes the property of diminishing returns. The function f(S) which gives the expected
number of nodes reached by S under the independent cascade model is known to be monotone submodular. It is well
known that whenever f is a monotone submodular function, the greedy algorithm gives a (1− 1/e)-approximation to
the problem max|S|≤k f(S).
It is natural to hope that submodularity would transfer to our election control objectives MOV and POV. Our
first result is that submodularity does in fact hold for the MOV objective with two candidates. Previous results for
influence maximization do not directly apply because the MOV objective only counts nodes who have c∗ in second
place. Nevertheless, similar reasoning applies.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithms for MOV objective
1: function GREEDY(h, k)
2: S ← ∅
3: while |S|< K do
4: v← arg maxv∈V \S h(S ∪ {v})− h(S)
5: S ← S ∪ {v}
6: return S
7: function MOVCONSTRUCTIVE(k)
8: h(S) :− Ey
[
f(S, y, V 2c∗)
]
9: return GREEDY(h, k)
10: function MOVDESTRUCTIVE(k)
11: h(S) :− Ey
[
f(S, y, V 1c∗)
]
12: return GREEDY(h, k)
Algorithm 2 Algorithms for POV objective
1: function ENUMERATETHRESHOLD(h, ∆, k)
2: for β = ∆...n do
3: h′(S) :− Ey [min (β, h(S, y))]
4: Sβ = GREEDY(h′, k)
5: return arg maxSβ ,β=∆....n Pry [h(Sβ , y) ≥ ∆]
6: function POVCONSTRUCTIVE(k)
7: //recall mC(S, y) = Ey
[
f(S, y, V 2c∗)
]
for 2-candidate case
8: return ENUMERATETHRESHOLD(mC , ∆C , k)
9: function POVDESTRUCTIVE(k)
10: return ENUMERATETHRESHOLD(mD, ∆D, k)
Theorem 1. In an election with two candidates, MOV is a monotone submodular function.
Proof. We first fix a particular scenario y and show that the function f(·, y, V 2c∗) is submodular. This suffices to
show that Ey[f(·, y, V 2c∗)] is submodular since a nonnegative linear combination of submodular functions remains
submodular. Monotonicity is clear since adding additional seeds to A can only make more nodes reachable. To show
submodularity, we can write the marginal gain as
f(A ∪ {x}, y, V 2c∗)− f(A, y, V 2c∗) =
∑
v∈V 2c∗
(1− χ(v,A, y))χ(v, {x}, y).
Compare the above expression for a set A and any B ⊇ A. For any single node v, χ(v,B, y) = 1 whenever
χ(v,A, y) = 1. Hence, the term in the above summation for each node v can only be smaller for f(B∪{x}, y, V 2c∗)−
f(B, y, V 2c∗) than for f(A ∪ {x}, y, V 2c∗) − f(A, y, V 2c∗). We conclude that f(A ∪ {x}, y, V 2c∗) − f(A, y, V 2c∗) ≥
f(B ∪ {x}, y, V 2c∗)− f(B, y, V 2c∗) and submodularity now follows by taking the expectation over y.
Hence, we can apply a greedy algorithm to MOV to obtain a (1− 1/e)-approximation (MOVCONSTRUCTIVE in
Algorithm 1). Moreover, this ratio is tight since MOV contains regular influence maximization as a special case when
all nodes have c∗ in second place (V 2c∗ = V ). It is NP-hard to approximate influence maximization with ratio better
than 1 − 1/e [28]. Hence, two-candidate MOV is computationally intractable with respect to exact optimization but
high quality and efficient approximation algorithms exist.
We now turn to the POV objective, where we maximize the probability that c∗ wins the election. It is natural to
think that submodularity may also carry over to this setting. However, this is not the case; we can provide a simple
counterexample where POV violates submodularity. Consider n isolated nodes, where n2 − k+ 1 have c∗ as their first
choice. Hence, to win the election it is necessary and sufficient to influence k nodes, which can be accomplished by
any choice of k seeds from among those with c∗ as their second choice. Fix a seed set B containing k − 1 of these
nodes and consider any A ⊂ B (that is, A is strictly smaller). We have POV(B) = POV(A) = 0. By adding a node
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v ∈ V 2c∗ \ B to B, we have POV(B ∪ {v}) − POV(B) = 1. However, since |A|< k − 1, POV(A ∪ {v}) = 0 and
hence POV(A∪{v})−POV(A) = 0. This contradicts the definition of submodularity. Essentially, the POV objective
displays a sharp threshold behavior, where additional seed nodes have no value until we are close to winning. This
behavior in fact translates into the following strong hardness result:
Theorem 2. It is NP-hard to compute an α-approximation to the problem max|S|≤k POV(S) for any α > 0, even for
two candidates and even when the instance is deterministic.
Proof. We consider a deterministic objective: the ICM with all propagation probabilities either 0 or 1. Without loss
of generality, we have only a single scenario and will drop the dependence on y in f . Suppose that we have an
α-approximation for POV-maximization. We show how we can use this algorithm to optimally solve the influence
maximization problem (i.e., maximizing f(·, V )), which is known to NP-hard since it includes maximum coverage
as a special case. Let OPTIM be the optimal value of the influence maximization problem and OPTPOV (∆) be
the optimal value for Problem 1 with the given threshold. Fix any ∆ > 0. If ∆ ≤ OPTIM , then there is a set S
with POV(S) = 1 and hence OPTPOV (∆) = 1. Otherwise, there is no set with value ∆ and OPTPOV (∆) = 0.
Since the objective to the POV problem is either 0 or 1, any α-approximation algorithm for it must return 1 whenever
OPTPOV (∆) = 1. Now, we can just enumerate over ∆ = 1...n, where n is the number of nodes in the graph. At
each value of ∆, we ask the α-approximation algorithm to solve the POV maximization problem with that value of ∆.
We return the solution corresponding to the highest value of ∆ for which we can find a set with f(S, V ) ≥ ∆. By the
above, this set is an optimal solution to the influence maximization problem.
We remark that since this hardness result has broader implications. Recall that POV(S) = Pry
[
f(S, y, V 2c∗) ≥ ∆
]
where by Theorem 1, f(S, y, V 2c∗) is a submodular function. Therefore, the inapproximability result in Theorem
2 shows that it is in general hard to approximate the problem of of maximizing the probability that a submodular
function exceeds a given threshold value. This is a natural objective in other domains, e.g. for a risk-averse decision
maker who wants to control the probability of a bad outcome.
We pair this hardness result with a positive algorithmic result regarding bicriteria approximations. A bicriteria
approximation algorithm gives up solution quality in more than one dimension, and is of interest when hardness results
preclude the usual notion of approximation (as for our problem). We provide an algorithm which has a solution quality
guarantee whenever the election is winnable by a “large margin”. That is, there is a seed set with high probability of
greatly exceeding ∆ votes. Our algorithm will attempt to maximize the probability of exceeding exactly ∆ votes, but
has a guarantee relative to the optimal value for threshold 1α∆ for some α < 1. That is, it is only compared to the
optimal value of a harder problem.
Our algorithm is a greedy strategy based on the surrogate function h(S) = Ey
[
min{β, f(S, y, V 2c∗)}
]
, where β
is a chosen threshold value. The intuition is to replace the sharp discontinuity of the original POV objective by a
surrogate which interpolates smoothly up to the threshold β. However, we do not give any “credit” for nodes reached
beyond β since (unlike in the MOV case) we only care about crossing the threshold. It is easy to see that the minimum
of a submodular function and a constant is itself submodular [29]. Hence, h is submodular and amenable to greedy
optimization. POVCONSTRUCTIVE (Algorithm 2) iterates over a series of possible thresholds for h, optimizes each
one greedily, and outputs the best of the resulting seed sets. Specifically, it tries every value of β from ∆...n. For each
β, it finds a seed set Sβ by greedily optimizing Ey
[
min{β, f(S, y, V 2c∗)}
]
(Algorithm 2, Lines 3-4). Then, it outputs
the Sβ which maximizes Pry
[
f(Sβ , y, V
2
c∗) ≥ ∆
]
, i.e., the one which has the best probability of exceeding the true
objective (Line 5).
The reason that we need to enumerate over values for β, instead of just using the true threshold ∆, is that optimizing
the surrogate h might result in a solution which has value below β in every scenario. However, we can show that if
OPT (β) is high, there must be many scenarios where Sβ has value close to β (a notion formalized in our proof).
Hence, if we try a sufficiently large β > ∆ and OPT (β) is still high, there must be many scenarios with value at least
∆. This is formalized in the following guarantee:
Theorem 3. In an election with two candidates, POVCONSTRUCTIVE produces a solution S such that
Pr
y
[f(S, y, V 2c∗) ≥ ∆] ≥ max0<α<1
(
1− 1e
)
OPTPOV
(
1
α∆
)− α
1− α
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Proof. POVCONSTRUCTIVE enumerates over values of α by trying thresholds β = ∆...n. Fix a specific β and set
α = ∆β . We will prove that Pry[f(Sβ , y, V
2
c∗) ≥ ∆] ≥
(1− 1e )OPTPOV ( 1α∆)−α
1−α . This suffices the prove the theorem
because we output the best of the Sβ . A minor point is that the theorem takes the max over 0 < α < 1, while we try
only the discrete points α = ∆∆ ,
∆
∆+1 , ...,
∆
n . However, these are equivalent because f(S, y, V
2
c∗) is always integral.
We divide the set of scenarios into those where the Sβ has value at least αβ and those where it has less value. Let
A = {y : f(Sβ , y, V 2c∗) ≥ αβ} and B = {y : f(Sβ , y, V 2c∗) < αβ}. We have
1
m
∑
y∈A
min{β, f(Sβ , y, V 2c∗)}+
1
m
∑
y∈B
min{β, f(Sβ , y, V 2c∗)}
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
max
|S|≤k
h(S) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
βm ·OPTPOV (β)
where the first inequality follows from submodularity and the second follows since the solution attaining value
OPTPOV (β) for the POV maximization problem is a feasible solution to the problem max|S|≤k h(S) which has value
at least βm · OPTPOV (β). We are interested in the minimum possible size of A given that the total value is lower
bounded as above. By inspection, |A| is minimized when min{β, f(S, y)} = β for each y ∈ A and f(S, y) = αβ for
each y 6∈ A. In this case, we have
|A|
m
+ α
(
1− |A|
m
)
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
OPTPOV (β)
and hence
|A|
m
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
1[f(Sβ , y, V
2
c∗) ≥ αβ] = Pry
[
f(Sβ , y, V
2
c∗) ≥ ∆
]
≥
(
1− 1e
)
OPTPOV
(
1
α∆
)− α
1− α
which completes the proof.
Theorem 3 in fact applies to the general problem of maximizing the probability that a submodular function exceeds
a threshold value (complementing our hardness result in Theorem 2). As discussed above, this may be of interest
independently of election control.
5 Multiple candidates
We now consider election control with more than two candidates. There is a target candidate c∗ and other candidates
c1...c`. Note that constructive and destructive control are distinct in this setting. We will give algorithms for both cases
for both the MOV and POV objectives.
The problem becomes significantly harder in the multicandidate setting because we must now reason simultane-
ously about several objectives – whether each alternate candidate ci will accumulate more votes that c∗. We demon-
strate that, up to the loss of a constant in the approximation ratio, it suffices to concentrate only on the number of
votes gained or lost by c∗ (not the margin against each ci individually). This concept yields (bicriteria) approximation
algorithms for each setting along the lines of the two-candidate case.
We start out with the MOVC objective (constructive control for the margin of victory), since the idea is simpler to
illustrate in this case. The basic intuition is that the change in margin between candidate ci and c∗ can be re-expressed
as follows:
gC(S, y, ci) =
∑
v∈V 2c∗\V 1ci
χ(v, S, y) + 2
∑
v∈V 2c∗∩V 1ci
χ(v, S, y)
= f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1ci
)
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Now, we can express the final margin in scenario y as
mC(S, y) = f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ min
cj
(
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1cj
)
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−
∣∣∣V 1cj ∣∣∣)
where the first term is common to all candidates and reflects the total number of voters who switch to c∗ and the min
term selects the cj who has the most remaining votes. In general, this second term can be very difficult to approximate
because it is the minimum of submodular functions, which is not in general submodular (or even approximable [29]).
We might hope that there is some special structure to the election control problem, but this is not the case:
Theorem 4. For any  > 0, it is NP-hard to compute any Ω
(
1
n1−
)
-approximation to the problem
max
|S|≤k
min
cj
(
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1ci
)
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1cj |
)
Proof. We will consider instances where all of the cj start with an equal number of votes and so maxci |V 1ci |−|V 1cj |=
0 for all cj . Thus, the problem is just max|S|≤k mincj f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1ci
)
. We reduce from the robust influence
maximization (RIM) problem [25, 8]. In RIM, we are given a set of objectives f1...fr, each of which represent
expected influence spread in an instance of the independent cascade model on a common underlying graph G. He and
Kempe [25] show that it is NP-hard to compute Ω
(
1
n1−
)
-approximation to the problem max|S|≤k mini=1...r fi(S).
Their proof holds when each fi is deterministic (assigns probability 0 or 1 to each edge), so we will assume that the
instance is in this form. Let Gi be a graph in which each edge of G assigned probability 0 by fi has been removed.
We create a graph G′ as follows. G′ contains each Gi as a disconnected subgraph. For every v ∈ G, we add a vertex
v′ to G′. v′ has an outgoing edge to the copy of node v in each of the Gi subgraphs. Each such edge has propagation
probability 1. There is a target candidate c∗ and r additional candidates c1...cr. Each of the v′ nodes that were added
has c∗ as their first choice. Each node in subgraph Gi has ci as their first choice and c∗ as their second choice.
Suppose that we have an α-approximation algorithm for our problem for some α = Ω
(
1
n1−
)
. Without loss of
generality, we will assume that this algorithm only selects nodes from the v′ (since if a seed set contains the copy
of v in any subgraph, we can only obtain greater influence spread by exchanging it for v′). Note that, for any such
set of seed nodes, fi(S) = f(S, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1ci) Thus, if S is an α-approximate solution for our problem, it is also an
Ω
(
1
n1−
)
-approximate solution to the RIM problem.
Therefore, we should not hope for any algorithm which can closely approximate the entirety of the objective; the
min component is too difficult to handle. However, we can leverage the fact that the first term, f(S, y, V 2c∗), is easy
to optimize because it is just a submodular function. Hence, the objective is the sum of an easy term and a hard term.
Importantly, we can show that optimizing just the easy term (which is what MOVCONSTRUCTIVE does) is sufficient
to obtain a constant factor approximation.
Theorem 5. MOVCONSTRUCTIVE obtains a 13
(
1− 1e
)
- approximation to the MOVC problem with any number of
candidates.
Proof. Let c(S, y) = arg minci f(V
2
c∗ ∩ V 1ci) − |V 1ci | be the candidate achieving the minimum in the definition of
mC . Let S∗ be an optimal seed set. Note that for all scenarios y, seed sets S, and candidates ci, f(S, y, V 2c∗) ≥
f(S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1ci). Hence, we have
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
) ] ≥ 1
3
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
Note that Ey[f(·, y, V 2c∗)] is a monotone submodular function, which MOVCONSTRUCTIVE greedily maximizes.
Let S be the resulting seed set. We have
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E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
≥ E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
) ]
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
which allows us to bound the margin of victory relative to S∗ as
MOVC(S) = E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ min
cj
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1cj
)
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1cj |
]
= E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−Ey
[
|V 1c(S,y)|
]
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−Ey
[
|V 1c(S,y)|
]
and some additional algebra (deferred to the appendix) yields
MOVC(S) ≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)(
MOVC(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S,y)|
])
.
Now by definition of c(S∗, y), f(S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y))− |V 1c(S∗,y)|≤ f(S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y))− |V 1c(S,y)| and so
|V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S,y)|≥ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
This yields
MOVC(S) ≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)(
MOVC(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ])
=
1
3
(
1− 1
e
)(
MOVC(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
) ])
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
MOVC(S∗).
We also have a corresponding result for the destructive control case. Here, we can rewrite the change in mar-
gin as mD(S, y) = f(S, y, V 1c∗) + maxci
(
f(S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2ci) + |V 1ci |−maxcj |V 1cj |
)
. MOVDESTRUCTIVE greedily
optimizes the submodular function Ey
[
f(S, y, V 1c∗)
]
, which we show is a good surrogate for Ey [mD(S, y)].
Theorem 6. MOVDESTRUCTIVE obtains a 12
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation to the multicandidate MOVD problem.
The proof, which is similar to that of Theorem 5, can be found in the appendix.
Now, we extend these ideas to obtain similar guarantees for the POVC and POVD objectives. Starting with POVC ,
recall that our objective is to maximize Pry [mC(S, y) ≥ ∆C ], the probability that the change in margin exceeds
the number of votes needed to win. We will prove a guarantee for the same algorithm POVCONSTRUCTIVE as
from the two-candidate case. Recall that POVCONSTRUCTIVE optimizes the surrogate Ey
[
min
(
β, f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
))]
,
enumerating over possible values of the threshold β. We have the following bicriteria approximation guarantee:
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Theorem 7. Let OPT (∆) denote the optimal value of the problem max|S|≤k Pry [mC(S, y) ≥ ∆]. Let S be the set
produced by POVCONSTRUCTIVE. We have
POVC(S) ≥ max
0<α<1
e−1
3e−1OPT
(
1
α∆C
)− α
1− α
The proof can be found in the appendix. The main difference from the two candidate case is that we do not directly
optimize 1m
∑
y min (β,mC(S, y)) since it may no longer be submodular. Instead, we greedily optimize the submodu-
lar surrogate function 1m
∑
y min
(
β, f(S, y, V 2c∗)
)
and show that this surrogate approximates 1m
∑
y min (β,mC(S, y)).
From there, the same argument as in Theorem 3 extends to the multicandidate case. Analogous reasoning also yields
a bicriteria guarantee for destructive control:
Theorem 8. Let OPT (∆) denote the optimal value of the problem max|S|≤k Pry [mD(S, y) ≥ ∆]. Let S be the set
produced by POVDESTRUCTIVE. We have
POVD(S) ≥ max
0<α<1
e−1
3e−1OPT (
1
α∆)− α
1− α
6 Exact solutions via mixed-integer programming
Thus far, we have only considered approximation algorithms for election control, motivated by computational hardness
results for exact optimization. Now we give mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulations to find exact so-
lutions. This serves two purposes. First, it allows us to study the effectiveness of election control for problem instances
with are within the range of state of the art MILP solvers. Second, we can determine the empirical effectiveness of the
approximation algorithms proposed in earlier sections.
There are two principal difficulties in obtaining MILP formulations. First, the objective is stochastic, ranging over
an exponential number of scenarios. Second, even for a single fixed scenario, the number of nodes reached by a seed
set is a nonlinear function.
We first show how to linearize the problem when have only a single scenario y. Recall that y corresponds to a
sampled graph Gy , where every edge e is removed independently with probability 1 − pe. Our MILP will have a
binary variable sv ∈ {0, 1} for each node v ∈ V , where sv = 1 indicates that v is a seed node. We will maximize
an objective over all sv ∈ {0, 1}|V | which satisfy
∑
v∈V sv ≤ k (at most k nodes are seeded). The challenge is to
embed the nonlinear objective into the constraints of the MILP. Let xyv, v ∈ V be a binary variable indicating whether
v is influenced in scenario y. We must constrain xyv to be 1 only if v truly is reachable in Gy from some node with
sv = 1. To accomplish this, let R(v, y) be the set of nodes which have a directed path to v in scenario y. R(v, y) does
not depend on the decision variables s and can easily precomputed. Using this set, we constrain the x variables as:
xyv ≤
∑
u∈R(v,y)
su ∀v ∈ V.
Now we deal with stochasticity in the objective using sample average approximation. We first sample a set of
scenarios Gyi , i = 1...r, maintaining a separate copy x
yi
v for each sampled scenario. Finally, we average over the
variables in each scenario to obtain the final objective.
6.1 Formulations
Using these components, we now give concrete formulations for each of the problem instances that we consider. We
will assume that scenarios y1...yr have been sampled, where r is a tunable parameter trading off computational cost
and sampling error.
10
6.1.1 Constructive control
We create a variable gC(yi, cj) for each scenario yi and candidate cj which represents the change in the margin
between cj and c∗ in scenario yi. Using these variables, we set a variablemC(yi) for each scenario yi which represents
the overall change in margin. These variables are set using the constraints
gC(yi, cj) ≤
∑
v∈V 2c∗
xyiv +
∑
v∈V 2c∗∩V 1cj
xyiv
mC(yi) ≤ gC(yi, cj) + max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1cj |∀i, j
Using these variables, we have the following MILP to maximize the MOV:
max
s,x,gC ,mC
1
r
r∑
i=1
mC(yi)∑
v∈V
sv ≤ k
The next formulation maximizes the POV:
max
s,x,gC ,mC ,u
1
r
r∑
i=1
ui
−M(1− ui) + max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1c∗ |+1−mC(yi) ≤ 0∑
v∈V
sv ≤ k, ui ∈ {0, 1} i = 1...r
Here, ui is a binary variable representing whether c∗ wins the election in scenario yi, while M is a large number.
6.1.2 Destructive control
Now, we use an analogous set of constraints to set variables gD(yi, cj) and mD(yi):
gD(yi, cj) ≤
∑
v∈V 1c∗
xyiv +
∑
v∈V 1c∗∩V 2cj
xyiv
−M(1− zji ) +mD(yi)−
(
gD(yi, cj) + |V 1cj |−maxk |V
1
ck
|
)
≤ 0 ∀i, j∑
j
zji ≥ 1 ∀i, zji ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j
The second and third constraints use a new set of binary variables zji , where z
j
i = 1 indicates that in scenario yi,
mD(yi) is at most the change in margin between cj and c∗. The constraint
∑
j z
j
i ≥ 1 requires that mD(yi) must be
bounded by one such value, and so can be at most the maximum margin. With these variables in place, the MOV and
POV MILPs are analogous to those for constructive control.
7 Experiments
We now present experimental results comparing the performance of our approximation algorithms to the solutions
found via mixed integer programming. We show results on four datasets. First, netscience, a collaboration network
of researchers in network science, with 1461 nodes [36]. Second, facebook, the subgraph centered on 10 Facebook
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Table 1: Percent of MILP value obtained by approximation algorithm.
netscience facebook polblogs irvine
k = 25 50 100 25 50 100 25 50 100 25 50 100
Constructive
|C|= 2 99.5 99.3 100. 100 100 100 100 100 99.4 100 100 99.4
|C|= 5 82.8 90.1 91.5 90.8 90.9 90.9 97.4 97.8 99.5 97.7 95.4 96.8
|C|= 10 80.9 89.1 98.3 80.9 83.7 88.6 98.7 99.2 99.6 96.9 97.4 98.9
Destructive
|C|= 2 99.9 99.6 99.9 100 100 100 100 100 99.4 100 99.8 98.8
|C|= 5 73.8 73.2 83.3 87.7 79.7 81.6 100 97.8 99.3 100 99.0 100
|C|= 10 75.9 87.2 97.2 81.8 85.0 89.0 98.9 99.3 99.6 100 97.3 99.0
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Figure 1: Probability of victory. Top: constructive. Bottom: destructive. Left: netscience. Right: polblogs.
users, with 2888 nodes [35]. Third, polblogs, a network of links between political blogs, with 1224 nodes [36].
Fourth, irvine, a graph representing instant messages exchanged between students at U.C. Irvine, with 1889 nodes
[35]. We select these datasets because they represent the kinds of social and communication networks on which
political messages (such as fake news) spread. We also note that our approximation algorithms can easily be scaled
to much larger networks since we can apply the same techniques developed in the influence maximization literature
[41, 13]. However, our focus here is to characterize the performance of our algorithms in comparison to the optimal
solution, so we select datasets which are feasible for mixed integer programming. For each network, we randomly
generated 30 sets of voter preferences.
We start out with the MOV objective. Table 1 shows the percentage of the MILP’s value which is obtained by
our approximation algorithms (MOVCONSTRUCTIVE and MOVDESTRUCTIVE respectively), averaging over the 30
instances on each network with propagation probability p = 0.1. We vary the number of seed nodes k and the
number of candidates |C|. We see that the approximation algorithms perform well across all settings, obtaining
expected change in margin at least 73% of that of the MILP. The approximation algorithms fare particularly well
for 2-candidate elections, obtaining nearly 100% of the optimal value on all networks. The empirical approximation
ratio degrades as the number of candidates grows, particularly when the budget k is small. We conclude that our
approximation algorithms are highly effective for election control via the MOV in both constructive and destructive
control, particularly in realistic settings with a moderate number of candidates.
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We now turn to the POV objectives. We show results for k = 50, |C|= 5, comparing our bicriteria approxima-
tion algorithms POVCONSTRUCTIVE and POVDESTRUCTIVE to the corresponding MILP formulations. To keep the
experiments timely, we ran each approximation algorithm for 150 random values of the threshold β instead of enu-
merating over all (empirically, this resulted in very similar solution quality). Figure 1 shows the results on netscience
and polblogs for constructive and destructive control. Results for facebook and irvine can be found in the appendix.
The x axis shows the starting margin (∆C or ∆D) in each randomly generated instance while the y axis shows the
probability of victory obtained. The instances fall into three groups. First, when the margin is small, both the approx-
imation algorithms and the MILP have a high POV. Second, when the margin is large, both have a small POV. Third
are intermediate points where the approximation algorithm and MILP strongly diverge. Averaged over all random
instances, the approximation algorithm obtains 40-60% of the MILP’s value (depending on the network). However,
there are instances among the intermediate cases where, e.g., the approximation algorithm obtains a POV of 0.1%,
but the MILP finds a solution with POV 99%. We conclude that election control for the POV objective can be very
computationally difficult in narrowly winnable elections. This dovetails with our theoretical results, which show that
the problem is inapproximable in general, but bicriteria guarantees are possible when the election is winnable by a
large margin.
8 Conclusion
Fake news and other targeted misinformation are an increasingly prevalent way of interfering with democratic elec-
tions. We introduce and study the problem of election control through social influence, providing algorithms and
hardness results for maximizing both the margin and probability of victory for an attacker in both constructive and
destructive control. Our results indicate that social influence is a salient threat to election integrity, particularly in
the MOV case where we provide high-quality approximation algorithms. Maximizing the probability of victory is
manageable in easier instances, but difficult both theoretically and empirically in narrow races.
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A Proofs
We now provide proofs that were deferred from the main text. We start out with with the full proofs for the MOVC
and MOVD objectives:
Theorem 5: MOVCONSTRUCTIVE obtains a 13
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation to the MOVC problem with any number of
candidates.
Proof. Let c(S, y) = arg minci f(V
2
c∗ ∩ V 1ci) − |V 1ci | be the candidate achieving the minimum in the definition of
mC . Let S∗ be an optimal seed set. Note that for all scenarios y, seed sets S, and candidates ci, f(S, y, V 2c∗) ≥
f(S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1ci). Hence, we have
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
) ] ≥ 1
3
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
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Note that Ey[f(·, y, V 2c∗)] is a monotone submodular function, which MOVCONSTRUCTIVE greedily maximizes.
Let S be the resulting seed set. We have
E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
≥ E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
) ]
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
and so
MOVC(S) = E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ min
cj
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1cj
)
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1cj |
]
= E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−Ey
[
|V 1c(S,y)|
]
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ]
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−Ey
[
|V 1c(S,y)|
]
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1c(S,y)|
]
=
1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
+ max
ci
|V 1ci |−|V 1c(S,y)|+|V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S∗,y)|
]
=
1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ min
cj
(
f(S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1cj )− |V 1cj |
)
+ f(S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)) + maxci |V
1
ci |−|V 1c(S,y)|+|V 1c(S∗,y)|
]
=
1
3
(
1− 1
e
)(
MOVC(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S,y)|
])
.
Now by definition of c(S∗, y), f(S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y))− |V 1c(S∗,y)|≤ f(S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y))− |V 1c(S,y)| and so
|V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S,y)|≥ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
This yields
MOVC(S) ≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)(
MOVC(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
)
+
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S,y)
) ])
=
1
3
(
1− 1
e
)(
MOVC(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
) ])
≥ 1
3
(
1− 1
e
)
MOVC(S∗).
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Theorem 6: MOVDESTRUCTIVE obtains a 12
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation to the multicandidate MOVD problem.
Proof. Now let c(S, y) = arg maxci f(V
1
c∗ ∩ V 2ci) + |V 1ci | be the candidate achieving the maximum in the definition
of mD. Let S∗ be an optimal seed set. Similarly to before, we have
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
) ] ≥ 1
2
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
) ]
.
MOVDESTRUCTIVE greedily maximizes Ey
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
) ]
. Call the resulting seed set S. We have
MOVD(S) = E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S,y)|−maxci |V
1
ci |
]
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
) ]
+ E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S,y)|−maxci |V
1
ci |
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
) ]
+ E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S,y)|−maxci |V
1
ci |
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S,y)|−maxci |V
1
ci |
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
E
y
[
f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
)
+ f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S,y)|+|V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S∗,y)|−maxci |V
1
ci |
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)[
MOVD(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1c(S,y)|−|V 1c(S∗,y)|
]]
.
Now using the definition of c(S, y), we have that f(S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)) + |V 1c(S,y)|≥ f(S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)) +
|V 1c(S∗,y)|. This yields
|V 1c(S,y)|−|V 1c(S∗,y)|≥ f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
and so we have
MOVD(S) ≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)[
MOVD(S∗) + E
y
[
f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
) ]]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
MOVD(S∗)
We now prove corresponding bicriteria guarantees for the POV objectives.
Theorem 7: Let OPT (∆) denote the optimal value of the problem max|S|≤k Pry [mC(S, y) ≥ ∆]. Let S be the set
produced by POVCONSTRUCTIVE. We have
POVC(S) ≥ max
0<α<1
e−1
3e−1OPT
(
1
α∆C
)− α
1− α
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Proof. The main difference from the two candidate case is that 1m
∑
y min (β,mC(S, y)) is no longer submodular
sincemC need not be a submodular function. However, the proof of Theorem 4.3 only uses submodularity in establish-
ing an approximation guarantee for greedy optimization of the surrogate. In the multicandidate case, we will greedily
optimize 1m
∑
y min
(
β, f(S, y, V 2c∗)
)
, which is submodular. Let Sβ be the resulting seed set and S∗ be a set that
optimizes 1m
∑
y min (β,mC(S, y)). If we can prove that
1
m
∑
y min (β,mC(Sβ , y)) ≥ γ 1m
∑
y min (β,mC(S
∗, y))
for some constant factor γ, then the same argument as in Theorem 4.3 extends to the multicandidate case. Fix any
particular value of β. We establish a constant factor approximation as follows:
1
m
∑
y
min (β,mC(S
∗, y)) =
1
m
∑
y
min (β,mC(Sβ , y) +mC(S
∗, y)−mC(Sβ , y))
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y) + f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
)− f (Sβ , y, V 2c∗)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
Sβ , y, V
2
c∗ ∩ V 1c(Sβ ,y)
)
+ |V 1c(Sβ ,y)|−|V 1C(S∗,y)|
)
Via the definition of c(S∗, y), we have that |V 1c(Sβ ,y)|−|V 1c(S∗,y)|≤ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(Sβ ,y)
)
−f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(S∗,y)
)
.
This yields
1
m
∑
y
min (β,mC(S
∗, y)) ≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y) + f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗ ∩ V 1c(Sβ ,y)
))
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y) + 2f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
) )
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y)
)
+
2
m
∑
y
min
(
β, f
(
S∗, y, V 2c∗
) )
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y)
)
+
1
m
2e
e− 1
∑
y
min
(
β, f
(
Sβ , y, V
2
c∗
) )
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y)
)
+
1
m
2e
e− 1
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y)
)
≤
(
1 +
2e
e− 1
)
1
m
∑
y
min
(
β,mC(Sβ , y)
)
and now the conclusion follows by applying the same argument as in Theorem 3.
Theorem 8: Let OPT (∆) denote the optimal value of the problem max|S|≤k Pry [mD(S, y) ≥ ∆]. Let S be the set
produced by POVDESTRUCTIVE. We have
POVD(S) ≥ max
0<α<1
e−1
3e−1OPT (
1
α∆)− α
1− α
Proof. Applying the reasoning as in Theorem 7, we have
1
m
∑
y
min (∆,mD(S
∗, y)) =
1
m
∑
y
min (∆,mC(S, y) +mD(S
∗, y)−mD(S, y))
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
∆,mD(S, y) + f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)− f (S, y, V 1c∗)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
)
− f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
+ |V 1C(S∗,y)|−|V 1C(S,y)|
)
.
The definition of c(S, y) implies that
|V 1c(S∗,y)|−|V 1c(S,y) ≤ f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S,y)
)
− f
(
S, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
)
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so we have
1
m
∑
y
min (∆,mD(S
∗, y)) ≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
∆,mD(S, y) + f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
)
+ f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗ ∩ V 2c(S∗,y)
))
≤ 1
m
∑
y
min
(
∆,mD(S, y) + 2f
(
S∗, y, V 1c∗
) )
and now the theorem follows from the same argument as in Theorem 7.
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Figure 2: Probability of victory in constructive control. Left: irvine. Right: facebook
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Figure 3: Probability of victory in destructive control. Left: irvine. Right: facebook. On irvine, the MILP was termi-
nated after 24 hours, and had not found competitive solutions with the approximation algorithm on the intermediate
margin instances by that time.
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